asking for an explanation signals that one just does not understand the culture (Malinowsky 1920; Raz 1986 ). Because they raise doubts about commitment to the sacred, trade-offs are often deemed, even in dispassionate interviews, morally corrosive. And the longer observers think that someone has contemplated an indecent proposal, the harsher their assessments of that person, even if he or she ultimately makes the "right" choice and affirms the sacred value. To compare is, in effect, to destroy (Raz 1986 ). For most Americans today, being caught calculating the opportunity costs of supporting one's young children or defending one's country is to reveal that one just does not "get it." (2012) showed that religious institutions and pharmaceutical companies need to be especially adept at cloaking self-interested policies in noble public-good rhetoric.
Because they traffic in sacred goods-our lives and souls-they will pay a steeper In a related study with a less august setting, McGraw and Tetlock (2005) showed how a wealthy college student who disliked doing communal chores in a group-living home could get away with paying a needy student to become his de facto servant, not by directly paying the student (which would be a taboo violation) but by paying the student's share of the electricity bill. "Getting away
with it" means less reputational cost to the wealthy student who avoids the chores.
Third-party observers make fewer nasty character attributions to the buyer of the service because the buyer has been cognitively repackaged as a friend returning a favor for a friend, which nicely illustrates the rhetorical-reframing power of the reciprocity norm (Gouldner 1960) . willingness to use genomic technology for correcting birth defects, but sharp opposition to enhancements, which carry the historical resonance of Nazism and
Aryan supremacy. Our analysis predicts that semi-hypocrites will be slow to acknowledge the looming threat but not fatally so. They will eventually find a sustainable moral equilibrium that distances them from the outrages of the early 20 th century but protects them against rivals in the mid-21st century.
III. Tradeoffs and Polarization
When people are not under accountability pressures from their jobs and roles to confront awkward secular-sacred tensions, they tend to look the other way, with the status quo becoming the default option (Lerner and Tetlock 1999) . Ultimately, though, the buck must stop somewhere. Someone must set priorities, a process that, however distasteful, requires attaching at least implicit monetary values to sacred values. If elites are to avoid incurring the righteous wrath of the masses, some combination of the following must happen: On a closing cautionary note, it is a core tenet of Durkheimian sociology that de-sacralization poses its own risks to individual and collective well-being.
Humanity needs rituals and a shared sense of sacredness to infuse our otherwise meaningless lives with significance-and, in the language of terror-management theory, ward off existential anxiety. In this view, people are incorrigibly attracted to moral frames and will resist efforts to bring the sacred into the realm of the profane. Homo sociologicus will not surrender without a fight to homo economicus.
